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Climate Change and the Challenges to 
Democracy 
MARCELLO DI PAOLA* & DALE JAMIESON** 
This Article explores the uneasy interaction between cli-
mate change and democracy, particularly liberal democ-
racy. Its central claim is that climate change and other prob-
lems of the Anthropocene—this new epoch into which no 
earthly entity, process, or system escapes the reach and in-
fluence of human activity—expose and exacerbate existing 
vulnerabilities in democratic theory and practice, particu-
larly in their currently dominant liberal form; and that both 
democracies’ failures and their most promising attempts at 
managing these problems expose democracies to significant 
legitimacy challenges. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In an oft-quoted passage of a paper co-authored with Hans Suess 
in 1957, climate science pioneer Roger Revelle wrote: 
[H]uman beings are now carrying out a large scale 
geophysical experiment of a kind that could not have 
happened in the past nor be reproduced in the future. 
Within a few centuries we are returning to the atmos-
phere and oceans the concentrated organic carbon 
stored in sedimentary rocks over hundreds of mil-
lions of years.1 
We are now beginning to see the implications of such an exper-
iment.2 The unusually high quantities of greenhouse gases that have 
crowded the Earth’s atmosphere during the past two centuries, 
mostly due to humans’ massive utilization of fossil energy sources, 
are currently at work remaking the planet.3 This may come at great 
cost, as the makeover process will likely cause, among other things, 
sea levels to rise; “more frequent and extreme weather events,” such 
as floods, hurricanes, and droughts; widespread eco-systemic dis-
ruptions; “more sweeping epidemics; food and water shortages; and 
vast and diverse ranges of second- and third-order problems (such 
                                                                                                             
 1 Roger Revelle & Hans E. Suess, Carbon Dioxide Exchange Between At-
mosphere and Ocean and the Question of an Increase of Atmospheric CO2 During 
the Past Decades, 9 TELLUS 18, 19 (1957). 
 2 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 6–7 (Rajendra K. Pachauri et al. eds., 2015) 
[hereinafter IPCC]. 
 3 See id. at 4–7. 
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as political instability and mass migrations) whose details will vary 
in different places, times, and sociopolitical contexts.”4 Climate 
change is, in many respects, the most dangerous experiment that hu-
mans have ever conducted.5 
Despite its magnitude and gravity, climate change is only one 
aspect of a larger picture. The rise in global temperature can be seen 
as a sign of global transformations that are so vast and deep that they 
merit the label of “epochal.”6 This is the discussion that has been 
triggered by the introduction of the term “Anthropocene” into envi-
ronmental discourse.7 
The term “Anthropocene” was coined by limnologist Eugene 
Stoermer in the 1980s, popularized by Nobel prize-winning chemist 
Paul Crutzen, and came to widespread public attention in a short 
article Stoermer and Crutzen published in 2000, in which they 
claimed that humanity had become a major geological force on the 
planet.8 In 2006, Hibbard et al. noted that since 1950, anthropogenic 
biological and geological changes had been subject to a “Great Ac-
celeration.”9 In 2011, Steffen et al. summarized the planet’s current 
situation in the following way: 
                                                                                                             
 4 Dale W. Jamieson & Marcello Di Paola, Political Theory for the Anthro-
pocene, in GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY 254, 257 (David Held & Pietro Maffet-
tone eds., 2016). 
 5 See DALE JAMIESON, REASON IN A DARK TIME: WHY THE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE FAILED AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR OUR FUTURE 1 
(2014). 
 6 See generally Will Steffen et al., The Anthropocene: Conceptual and His-
torical Perspectives, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 842, 842–43 
(2011). 
 7 See CHRISTOPHE BONNEUIL & JEAN-BAPTISTE FRESSOZ, THE SHOCK OF 
THE ANTHROPOCENE: THE EARTH, HISTORY AND US 3–4 (David Fernbach trans., 
2016); see also CHRISTIAN SCHWÄGERL, THE ANTHROPOCENE: THE HUMAN ERA 
AND HOW IT SHAPES OUR PLANET 52–53 (Lucy Renner Jones trans., 2014), 
https://www.synergeticpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Anthro-Review-
Copy.pdf. 
 8 Paul J. Crutzen & Eugene F. Stoermer, The “Anthropocene,” 41 GLOBAL 
CHANGE NEWSL. 17, 17–18 (2000); see also Paul J. Crutzen, Geology of Mankind, 
415 NATURE 23, 23 (2002). 
 9 Kathy A. Hibbard et al., Group Report: Decadal-scale Interactions of Hu-
mans and the Environment, in SUSTAINABILITY OR COLLAPSE?: AN INTEGRATED 
HISTORY AND FUTURE OF PEOPLE ON EARTH 341, 342 (Robert Costanza et al. eds., 
2006). On the stratigraphic evidence for the Anthropocene, see Jan Zalasiewicz et 
al., Stratigraphy of the Anthropocene, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 
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In addition to the carbon cycle, humans are (i) signif-
icantly altering several other biogeochemical, or ele-
ment cycles, such as nitrogen, phosphorus and sul-
phur, that are fundamental to life on the Earth; (ii) 
strongly modifying the terrestrial water cycle by in-
tercepting river flow from uplands to the sea and, 
through land-cover change, altering the water vapour 
flow from the land to the atmosphere; and (iii) likely 
driving the sixth major extinction event in Earth his-
tory. Taken together, these trends are strong evidence 
that humankind, our own species, has become so 
large and active that it now rivals some of the great 
forces of Nature in its impact on the functioning of 
the Earth system.10 
However, the Anthropocene is not yet an established geological 
category, and its introduction and extensive adoption in some circles 
has given rise to controversy.11 This Article will not directly address 
these controversies, but it will use the term because it reminds us 
that climate change is not a “one off” problem but part of a system-
atic transformation of the planet and human relationships with na-
ture that will continue for the foreseeable future.12 Whatever else is 
                                                                                                             
1036, 1037–43 (2011). For a proposal on when the Anthropocene should be 
thought to have begun, see Jan Zalasiewicz et al., When Did the Anthropocene 
Begin? A Mid-Twentieth Century Boundary Level is Stratigraphically Optimal, 
383 QUATERNARY INT’L 196, 197, 200–01 (2015). 
 10 Steffen et al., supra note 6, at 843 (internal citation omitted). 
 11 For a clear statement of objections on geological grounds, see generally 
Stanley C. Finney & Lucy E. Edwards, The “Anthropocene” Epoch: Scientific 
Decision or Political Statement?, GEOLOGICAL SOC’Y AM. TODAY, Mar.–Apr. 
2016, at 4, 4, 6–9. On various conceptual controversies on the Anthropocene in 
the humanities, social sciences and environmental philosophy, see generally Clive 
Hamilton et al., Thinking the Anthropocene, in THE ANTHROPOCENE AND THE 
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS: RETHINKING MODERNITY IN A NEW EPOCH 1, 
1–12 (Clive Hamilton et al., eds. 2015); Tom Butler, Lives Not Our Own, in 
KEEPING THE WILD: AGAINST THE DOMESTICATION OF EARTH ix–xiii (George 
Wuerthner et al. eds., 2014). 
 12 For our interventions in these controversies, see generally Jamieson & Di 
Paola, supra note 4, at 256; Marcello Di Paola, Virtues for the Anthropocene, 24 
ENVTL. VALUES 183, 183–86 (2015); DALE JAMIESON & BONNIE NADZAM, LOVE 
IN THE ANTHROPOCENE 11–27 (2015); Dale Jamieson, The Anthropocene: Love It 
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true, the world of the twenty-first century will be increasingly dif-
ferent from the world of our grandparents—with unprecedented 
numbers of humans, rapid technological change, global intercon-
nectedness, massive exploitation of nature, and consequent ecolog-
ical degradation marking the difference.13 Each of these changes, 
and their various combinations, have political dimensions and con-
sequences and contribute to configuring novel operating spaces for 
political theory. 
In this Article, we explore the uneasy relationship between cli-
mate change and democracy, with special attention to its currently 
dominant and most widely practiced model: liberal democracy. Our 
interest is not in liberal democracies’ historical responsibilities for 
climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene, but rather 
in the interaction between such problems and democracy. 
Our central claims are that climate change and other problems 
of the Anthropocene expose and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities 
in democratic theory and practice, particularly in their currently 
dominant liberal version, and that both democracies’ failures and 
their most promising attempts at managing these problems expose 
them to significant legitimacy challenges. We expect these chal-
lenges to increase as the Anthropocene intensifies. 
In Part II, we analyze the twin challenges of climate change and 
governance, and of democracy and representation. In Part III, we 
briefly survey the history of attitudes towards democracy, showing 
how recent its almost universal celebration really is. In Part IV, we 
discuss democracy’s most influential current form, liberal democ-
racy. In Part V, we sketch some of democracy’s vulnerabilities. In 
Part VI, we focus on the interlocking crises of democracy and cli-
mate change. Finally, in Part VII, we draw some conclusions. 
II. THE TWIN CHALLENGES 
We are living in a period in which many perceive both an envi-
ronmental crisis, best exemplified in climate change, and a crisis in 
                                                                                                             
or Leave It, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
HUMANITIES 13, 13–15 (Ursula K. Heise et al. eds., 2017). 
 13 See generally IPCC, supra note 2, at 4–7, 95–97. 
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governance.14 Climate change continues almost unabated,15 and 
democratic governments are increasingly seen as ineffectual and un-
responsive with respect to this problem and to a range of other prob-
lems as well.16 In order to tease out the possible relationships be-
tween the challenges of climate change and governance, we need to 
appreciate each in its own terms. 
A. Climate Change and Governance 
The most systematic attempts at climate governance have been 
through the international system, taking nation-states as primary 
agents.17 The crowning achievement has been the Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (FCCC), which opened for signature at 
the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and has been ratified by 196 states 
and the European Union.18 The parties to the FCCC committed 
themselves to stabilizing “greenhouse gas concentrations in the at-
mosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic in-
terference with the climate system.”19 In a series of statements, dec-
larations, and agreements, “dangerous anthropogenic interference [] 
with the climate system” has come to be understood as a 2 degree 
Celsius increase in Earth’s mean surface temperature from a late 
twentieth-century baseline.20 The Earth has already warmed .8 de-
grees Celsius over the last thirty years; and a recent paper suggests 
                                                                                                             
 14 See HAYLEY STEVENSON & JOHN S. DRYZEK, DEMOCRATIZING GLOBAL 
CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 3–6 (2014); Jamieson & Di Paola, supra note 4, at 270–
73. 
 15 See the latest data at NOAA National Centers for Environmental Infor-
mation. State of the Climate: Global Climate Report, NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. 
INFO., https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/201703. 
 16 See Jamieson & Di Paola, supra note 4, at 274–76. 
 17 See generally JAMIESON, supra note 5, at 34–59 (discussing climate diplo-
macy). 
 18 Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate 
Change, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_back-
ground/items/6031.php (last visited Dec. 19, 2017); First Steps to a Safer Future: 
Introducing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/con-
vention/items/6036.php (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
 19 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. II, opened 
for signing June 4, 2012, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994). 
 20 Joel B. Smith et al., Assessing Dangerous Climate Change Through an 
Update of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) “Reasons for 
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that even if emissions were to stop immediately, we may already be 
committed to a 1.5 degree Celsius warming.21 194 nations, as well 
as the European Union, have signed the Paris Agreement; 171 have 
ratified it, including the United States;22 and 165 have made volun-
tary commitments to reduce their emissions.23 Nonetheless, even if 
all these commitments are kept, the Earth may still be on its way to 
a 3 degree Celsius warming.24 
There are many reasons why climate change is such a difficult 
issue. One glaring reason is that climate change has many properties 
that demonstrate that it might be “the world’s largest collective ac-
tion problem.”25 No country can singularly secure the global public 
good of climate stability; high-emitting rich countries do not want 
developing countries to follow in their footsteps, while developing 
countries want rich countries to lead in reducing emissions.26 To 
make matters worse, each country wants to benefit from its own 
greenhouse gas emissions while others reduce their emissions.27 To 
a large extent, these behaviors simply follow from the logic of col-
lective action: for each actor, “defection dominates cooperation, [no 
matter how] others act.”28 
Climate change also poses an intergenerational collective action 
problem: since every generation benefits from its own emissions, 
                                                                                                             
Concern,” 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 4133, 4135–36 (2008); accord What 
Is Dangerous Interference with the Climate System?, IPCC, https://www.ipcc.ch/
publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch1s1-2-2.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2017). 
 21 See Thorsten Mauritsen & Robert Pincus, Letter, Committed Warming In-
ferred from Observations, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 652, 652–54 (2017). 
 22 Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php (last visited Dec. 19, 
2017). 
 23 See Welcome to the Interim NDC Registry, NDC REGISTRY (INTERIM), 
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Dec. 19, 
2017). 
 24 See Fiona Harvey, World on Track for 3C of Warming Under Current 
Global Climate Pledges, Warns UN, GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2016, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/nov/03/world-on-track-for-3c-
of-warming-under-current-global-climate-pledges-warns-un. 
 25 JAMIESON, supra note 5, at 4. 
 26 See id. at 35–38, 45, 57. 
 27 See, e.g., id. at 57. 
 28 Id. at 99. For more on these claims, see id. at 11–61, 96–102. 
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but the costs of climate change are mostly deferred to future gener-
ations, each generation has an incentive not to control its emis-
sions.29 Furthermore, since “each generation (except the first) suf-
fers from the emissions of previous generations, benefiting from 
their own present emissions may even appear to be just compensa-
tion for what they have suffered” and  “this reasoning leads to the 
continuous build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere over 
time.”30 
These problems are even worse than they seem, as climate 
change does not involve a single intra- and a single inter-genera-
tional collective action problem: jurisdictional boundaries and com-
peting scales lead to multiple, overlapping, and hierarchically em-
bedded collective action problems.31 A wide range of behaviors by 
individuals, nations, firms, and other entities affect the climate, but 
they are governed by an equally vast array of different regimes with 
different mandates.32 For example, decisions about trade and intel-
lectual property affect greenhouse gas emissions, but each area is 
governed by its own legal regimes.33 
This may seem abstract, but on a daily basis we witness policy 
failures and dysfunctions that are driven by the same dynamics, even 
when the problems are less complex than climate change—for ex-
ample, when an industrial city pollutes the waters of a surrounding 
area.34 Much like a city acts in the interest of its residents (who are 
employed by the industry), but not of residents of surrounding areas 
(who are affected by the pollution), states and especially “well-func-
tioning democracies act in the interest of the governed rather than 
                                                                                                             
 29 See generally Stephen M. Gardiner, The Pure Intergenerational Problem, 
86 MONIST 481, 481–85 (2003) (“Ethical issues concerning future people are usu-
ally conceived of as problems of future generations.”). 
 30 Dale Jamieson, The Nature of the Problem, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY 47 (John S. Dryzek et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter 
The Nature of the Problem]. 
 31 See Jamieson & Di Paola, supra note 4, at 262–63. 
 32 See id. at 267–69. 
 33 See, e.g., Gladwin Isaac & Trishna Menon, When Good Intentions Are Not 
Enough: Revisiting the US-India Solar Panels WTO Dispute, 10 OIDA INT’L J. 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 37, 37–38, 43 (2017) (With respect to trade, the WTO has 
ruled against India’s requirement that solar panels be produced domestically, 
which India argued was necessary to have low cost solar power). 
 34 JAMIESON, supra note 5, at 100. 
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on behalf of all those whose interests are affected.”35 The benefits 
from the activities that cause climate change primarily accrue to 
those who are members of particular political communities, while 
the costs are primarily borne by those who are not.36 In the case of 
climate change, the “costs are [mostly] borne by those who live be-
yond the borders of the major emitters, future generations, animals, 
and nature.”37 
B. Democracy and Representation 
Democratically elected governments have been largely ineffec-
tive in addressing climate change, as well as a host of other global 
problems and their domestic implications.38 These include (to vary-
ing degrees in different countries) pollution and biodiversity loss, 
nuclear waste management, nuclear proliferation, cyber-(in)secu-
rity, financial insecurity, business flight, growing wealth inequality, 
public debt management, migration, intercultural integration, and 
terrorist radicalization. The supranational institutions that these gov-
ernments have created and supported, like the United Nations and 
the European Union, have not been particularly successful in ad-
dressing these issues either.39 
In many democratic countries, citizens are not only frustrated 
with the relatively poor performances of their governments, but also 
increasingly resentful of institutions and procedures that they per-
ceive as inaccessible, arcane, dominated by partisan interests, 
crowded with rent-seekers, and generally detached and unrespon-
sive to their needs and interests.40 
                                                                                                             
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 136. 
 37 There are many other reasons why we have failed to act on climate change. 
For further discussion, see generally JAMIESON, supra note 5, at 61–103. 
 38 Jonathan Boston & Frieder Lempp, Climate Change: Explaining and Solv-
ing the Mismatch Between Scientific Urgency and Political Inertia, 24 ACCT., 
AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 1000, 1001 (2011); See JAMIESON, supra note 
5, at 100. 
 39 See Boston & Lempp, supra note 38, at 1000–11. 
 40 See generally Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government, 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/
11/23/beyond-distrust-how-americans-view-their-government/. On reasons for 
popular discontent in the United States, see generally Jill Lepore, Richer and 
Poorer: Accounting for Inequality, NEW YORKER (Mar. 16, 2015), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/03/16/richer-and-poorer. 
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A democratic deficit in many self-declared democracies has viv-
idly been put on display in cases in which majority preferences have 
failed to be translated into policy. For example, in the United States, 
for at least the last twenty-five years, most Americans have favored 
stricter gun control laws, yet gun control laws have consistently 
been weakened.41 In Italy, the outcomes of many popular referenda, 
including those regarding the introduction of legal liability for mag-
istrates (1985, 80.2% in favor) and the abolition of public funding 
for political parties (1993, 90% in favor), have been ignored either 
flatly or through artful reformulation of existing legislation.42 
The relation between majoritarianism and democracy is com-
plex, and it would surely be a mistake to postulate that a democracy 
must enact every popular policy preference, or that every democratic 
institution must be majoritarian.43 Still, it is hard to imagine a de-
mocracy that had no majoritarian governance institutions. Yet, if we 
accept this thought, then the democratic status of many countries 
that think of themselves as democracies is seriously in question. 
                                                                                                             
 41 See Guns, GALLUP NEWS, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2017); Ed Pilkington, NRA: 10 Ways It Has Weakened Gun-
control Laws in the US, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2012, 2:58 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/13/nra-weakened-gun-control-laws. See 
generally Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Poli-
tics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 570–
75 (2014). 
 42 See Davide Casati, Referendum, e Ora? I Casi di Referendum Votati (e 
Ignorati), GQ ITALIA (June 14, 2011), https://www.gqitalia.it/httpredir/r.php?q=/
viral-news/articles/2011/6/referendum-cosa-cambia-ora-dopo-la-vittoria-dei-si-i-
casi-precedenti-dal-finanziamento-pubblico-al-nucleare-ai-ministeri-di-turismo-
e-agricoltura/. 
 43 See generally Stephen Macedo, Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Val-
ues and Institutional Design, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1029 (2010).  
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Consider, for example, the United States.44 Of the three branches 
of federal government, the judicial branch is avowedly anti-majori-
tarian.45 Until recently, many Americans probably regarded the 
presidency as a majoritarian institution despite the existence of the 
Electoral College, which many people regarded as simply “rubber 
stamping” the popular vote. This illusion has been shattered by the 
fact that two of the last five elections resulted in the winner of the 
popular vote being denied the presidency.46 This leaves the Con-
gress as the putative majoritarian institution in the United States’ 
federal government.47 However, in the 2016 elections, Democrats 
won 56% of the aggregate national vote in Senate races, while Re-
publicans won 65% of the seats.48 According to a venerable Ameri-
can platitude, it is the House of Representatives that is “the People’s 
                                                                                                             
 44 The Economist reclassified the United States as a “flawed democracy” (as 
opposed to a “full democracy”) in 2016, largely due to eroding public confidence 
in American political institutions as documented in surveys by Gallup, Pew, and 
others. See Declining Trust in Government is Denting Democracy, ECONOMIST 
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/01/daily-
chart-20; see also Eric Zuesse, Jimmy Carter Is Correct that the U.S. Is No Longer 
a Democracy, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-
zuesse/jimmy-carter-is-correct-t_b_7922788.html (last updated Aug. 3, 2016). 
While most Americans today think of the United States as a democracy at least in 
aspiration, the framers never took themselves to be designing a democracy in an-
ything like the contemporary sense of the term. See infra Part III.B. 
 45 Except, of course, among its members. See Helen J. Knowles, Remember, 
It Is the Supreme Court That Is Expounding: The Least Dangerous Branch and 
Popular Constitutionalism, 41 U. DAYTON L. REV. 33, 33 (2016). A cynic with a 
sense of irony might say that the Supreme Court practices a kind of “democratic 
centralism.” See Terrance Ball & Richard Dagger, Politics: Democratic Central-
ism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/democratic-
centralism (last updated Nov. 5, 2015). 
 46 See Michael McAuliff et al., Electoral College About to Screw Democrats 
for Second Time in 20 Years, HUFFINGTON POST: POLITICS (Nov. 9, 2016, 2:00 
PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/democrats-popular-vote-presiden-
tial_us_582246c4e4b0aac62487dde9. 
 47 See Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to 
Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 361, 372 (2008). 
 48 These statistics were calculated using data from the Cook Political Report 
and Vital Statistics on Congress. See Molly E. Reynolds, Republicans in Congress 
Got a Seats Bonus” This Election (Again), BROOKINGS: FIXGOV (Nov. 22, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/11/22/gop-seats-bonus-in-con-
gress/ (including the links to the Cook Political Report and Vital Statistics on 
Congress). 
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House”: members of the House of Representatives were the only 
federal officials to be directly elected by the people in 1789 and their 
charge is to represent the people of their districts rather than their 
states.49 Yet, in the 2016 elections, Republicans won 48.7% of the 
aggregate vote in House races but won 55.4% of the seats.50 While 
much more support would be needed to defend the claim that the 
United States is not a democracy, it is clear that there is currently no 
reliably majoritarian institution in the federal government.51 
Consider a similar example from the United Kingdom.52 In the 
2017 election, the Conservatives won 42% of the aggregate vote but 
49% of the parliamentary seats.53 The Liberal Democrats won 7% 
of the vote but only 2% of the seats.54 According to a recent study, 
Labour would have won the 2017 election under several voting sys-
tems used in other countries’ national elections that are more repre-
sentative than Britain’s “First Past the Post” system.55 
These results have led to a widespread perception of democratic 
deficits; this has contributed to the rise of so-called “populist” move-
ments in many liberal democratic countries, including countries in 
the European Union, the United States, and others.56 These move-
ments and their leaders oppose existing power structures in the name 
                                                                                                             
 49 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (now super-
ceded by U.S. CONST. amend XII); The People of the People’s House, HISTORY, 
ART & ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Peo-
ple/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). 
 50 See Reynolds, supra note 48. 
 51 See Zuesse, supra note 44. 
 52 See, e.g., Ben Kentish, Jeremy Corbyn Could Now Be Prime Minister if 
UK’s Electoral System Wasn’t ‘Broken’, Claims Study, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 21, 
2017, 3:38 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jeremy-corbyn-
uk-prime-minister-uk-electoral-system-broekn-first-past-post-labour-leader-the-
resa-may-a7905191.html. 
 53 JESS GARLAND & CHRIS TERRY, ELECTORAL REFORM SOCIETY, THE 2017 
GENERAL ELECTION: VOLATILE VOTING, RANDOM RESULTS 11, https://www.
electoral-reform.org/uk/latest-news-and-research/publications/the-2017-general-
election-report/. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 29–35, https://www.electoral-reform.org/uk/latest-news-and-re-
search/publications/the-2017-general-election-report/. Previous British elections 
have been even worse at translating popular votes into parliamentary seats. Id. 
 56 For an overview of populist phenomena across continents, see CAS MUDDE 
& CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER, POPULISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 
21–41, 79–96 (2017). See also JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 7–11 
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of the people, portray incumbents as inept and detached from citi-
zens’ everyday realities and needs, and advocate change by popular 
demand, circumventing entrenched institutional agents and proce-
dures.57 What is often characteristic of these leaders and movements 
is a yearning for a mythologized past of popular sovereignty in 
which politicians came from “the people,” citizens’ opinions were 
integral to the mechanisms of governance, citizens’ needs and inter-
ests were the sole preoccupation of government, bureaucrats did not 
rule, and things actually got done.58 
Populism can be a powerful democratizing force, especially at 
the early stage of democratization processes.59 This can be seen in 
the rise of the Solidarity Labor Union in Poland, which resisted the 
Soviet regime, led the transition from communism to democratic 
elections, and won Poland’s democratic election of 1989.60 It can 
also be seen in the rise of the American Democratic Party, which 
was founded in 1828 during the wave of Jacksonian populism.61 
Populist leaders and movements typically begin their political ven-
tures to defend groups of citizens they believe have been systemati-
cally neglected by incumbent elites.62 Thus, some describe populism 
as a radical form of democracy and argue that the end of populism 
would mean the end of democratic politics itself. 63 
Populist leaders and movements champion the principle of pop-
ular sovereignty above all and typically defend some extreme form 
                                                                                                             
(2016); David Marquand, The People is Sublime: The Long History of Populism, 
From Robespierre to Trump, NEWSTATESMAN (July 24, 2017), https://www.
newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2017/07/people-sublime-long-history-populism-
robespierre-trump. 
 57 Marquand, supra note 56. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 56, at 79–96 (discussing popu-
lism’s democratic spirit and its role at different stages of the democratizing pro-
cess). 
 60 See id. at 88–89; Solidarity: Polish Organization, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Solidarity (last updated Jan. 27, 
2016). 
 61 See DAVID GRAEBER, There Never Was a West: Or, Democracy Emerges 
from the Spaces in Between, in POSSIBILITIES: ESSAYS ON HIERARCHY, 
REBELLION, AND DESIRE 329, 345 (2007). 
 62 See Marquand, supra note 56. 
 63 See Ernesto Laclau, Populism: What’s in a Name, in POPULISM AND THE 
MIRROR OF DEMOCRACY 32, 47–49 (Francisco Panizza ed., 2005). 
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of majoritarianism.64 Thus, populist movements are essentially dem-
ocratic. However, they can be at odds with democracies that check 
and balance, or filter and buffer, popular sovereignty through insti-
tutions, including constitutions and bills of rights; bodies of experts, 
including judges, academics, and the professional press; administra-
tive procedures, including bureaucratic procedures; partnerships 
with forces from civil society, including banks and businesses; and 
generally any power center not appointed by and accountable to the 
majority of the people.65 As Mudde and Kaltwasser put it: 
[P]opulism raises the question of who controls the 
controllers. As it tends to distrust any unelected in-
stitution that limits the powers of the demos, popu-
lism can develop into a form of democratic extrem-
ism or, better said, of illiberal democracy.66 
The challenge of democracy and representation can be expressed 
as a dilemma that forces us to think about the very nature of democ-
racy. Frustration with the failures of existing avowedly democratic 
states is leading to a resurgence of populism, which can be seen as 
a purer expression of democracy than the prevailing liberal demo-
cratic model.67 But managing the problems of the Anthropocene re-
quires a steadiness of outlook and a long-term perspective that 
seems in many ways antithetical to the populist posture. The fear is 
that we may be caught between political paralysis and paroxysms of 
extreme and arbitrary actions. 
III.  DEMOCRACY OLD AND NEW 
Dilemmas cannot always be solved. Sometimes we are fortunate 
if they can be managed. First of all, however, they must be under-
stood. 
                                                                                                             
 64 See MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 56, at 81. 
 65 See generally MÜLLER, supra note 56, at 56–57. 
 66 MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 56, at 82. 
 67 See McAuliff et al., supra note 46; André Munro, Populism: Political Pro-
gram or Movement, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
topic/populism (last updated Oct. 14, 2015); Uri Friedman, What Is a Populist?, 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2017/02/what-is-populist-trump/516525/. 
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In the broadest sense, democracy can be thought of as “[t]hat 
form of government in which the sovereign power resides in and is 
exercised by the whole body of free citizens.”68 From its earliest 
days, democracy has tilted in two different directions.69 In one di-
rection, democracy is seen as embodying a procedure for political 
decision-making.70 In the other direction, democracy is seen as em-
bodying substantive values.71 This tension, as well as some im-
portant sources of skepticism about democracy, go back to its an-
cient origins in Athens.72 
A. Democracy in the Ancient World 
Democracy in the substantive sense is captured in the words of 
Pericles, a politician, orator, and military leader who administered 
popular decisions in ancient Athens during the fifth century BC:73 
Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbor-
ing states; we are rather a pattern to others than imi-
tators ourselves. Its administration favours the many 
instead of the few; this is why it is called a democ-
racy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice 
to all in their private differences; if no social stand-
ing, advancement in public life falls to reputation for 
capacity, class considerations not being allowed to 
interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the 
way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not hin-
dered by the obscurity of his condition. The freedom 
                                                                                                             
 68 Democracy, LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/democracy/ 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
 69 Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY 
AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 21, 21 (Seyla 
Benhabib ed., 1996). 
 70 Id. at 21–23. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See infra Part III.A. 
 73 See David Malcolm Lewis, Pericles, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Pericles-Athenian-statesman (last up-
dated Apr. 21, 2017). 
384 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:369 
 
we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordi-
nary life.74 
For Pericles, the principle of popular sovereignty is supported 
by the principle of isonomia, or equality before the law, and enriched 
by the principle of eleutheria, or individual liberty.75 Per Aristotle, 
[A] basic principle of the democratic form of govern-
ment is eleutheria . . . for every democracy has eleu-
theria as its aim. Ruling and being ruled in turn is 
one element of eleutheria . . . Another is to live as 
you like. For this, they say, is a function of being 
free, since living not as you like is the function of a 
slave.76 
Isonomia and eleutheria are principles to which all contempo-
rary liberal democrats subscribe.77 In this respect, Pericles’ democ-
racy can be seen as an embryonic version of liberal democracy.  
However, Pericles’ democracy was quite different from its liberal 
descendant.78 In particular, liberal democracy adds a principle of 
civil and political equality whereby all individuals are born or cre-
ated as equals and should be treated as equals by others, the govern-
ment, and generally in the political process.79 This principle is dis-
tinctly liberal and modern, and was absent from Pericles’ proto-lib-
eral democracy which reflected the intense concern of its citizens 
                                                                                                             
 74 As reported by the historian Thucydides in 2 THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY 
OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Richard Crawley trans., 2009) (431 
B.C.E.), http://classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.html (last visited Dec. 22, 
2017). 
 75 Robert W. Wallace, Law, Freedom, and the Concept of Citizens’ Rights in 
Democratic Athens, in DĒMOKRATIA: A CONVERSATION ON 
DEMOCRACIES, ANCIENT AND MODERN 105, 105 (Josiah Ober & Charles Hen-
drick eds., 1996). 
 76 Id. 
 77 See infra Part IV. 
 78 Jennifer Roberts, The Creation of Legacy: A Manufactured Crisis in Eight-
eenth-Century Thought, in ATHENIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 81, 82–83 (J. Peter Euben et al. 
eds., 1994). 
 79 E.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); G.A. Res. 
217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). See gener-
ally Roberts, supra note 78, at 82–83. 
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for all “differences among individuals—differences between hu-
mans and animals, between males and females, between free people 
and slaves, between men who owned property and men who did not, 
and of course, between Greeks and non-Greeks.”80 Women, slaves, 
and all those who were considered foreigners were excluded from 
voting in Athens.81 Thus, the principles of popular sovereignty, 
equality before the law, and individual liberty applied only to a frac-
tion of the population of Pericles’ Athens.82 However, according to 
many ancient commentators, such as Plato and Aristotle, that was 
still far too much power in the hands of the people.83 
While the Romans never adopted democracy, they invented re-
publicanism—a mixed constitution capable of managing the tug-of-
war between “the people” and “the elites” that has been replicated 
throughout Western history and is with us today.84 Tasked with gov-
erning a far greater number of people than the government in Ath-
ens, with soldiers who were often more loyal to their generals than 
the state and slaves who were frequently uprising and rebelling, 
Rome was forced to provide the people with some form of political 
influence.85 While the Romans incorporated selected elements of 
democracy in their constitution through mechanisms of representa-
tion, the Roman Senate surrounded these mechanisms with a net of 
constitutional, administrative, and other constraints that effectively 
and severely limited the people’s influence over legislation and pol-
icy, thus yielding a de facto oligarchy.86 Throughout the duration of 
the Roman republic, most Roman rulers including the Senate, many 
plebeian tribunes, and other self-appointed champions of the people, 
                                                                                                             
 80 Roberts, supra note 78, at 83. 
 81 Donald Kagan, Periclean Athens and Modern Democracy, AEI: POL. & 
PUB. OPINION (June 8, 1993), http://www.aei.org/publication/periclean-athens-
and-modern-democracy/. 
 82 DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 19 (3d ed. 2006). 
 83 See id. at 17, 23–26 (discussing ancient criticisms of democracy). 
 84 See id. at 28. 
 85 See ANTONIO SANTOSUOSSO, STORMING THE HEAVENS: SOLDIERS, 
EMPERORS, AND CIVILIANS IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE 39–40 (2001); PHILIP 
MATYSZAK, THE ENEMIES OF ROME: FROM HANNIBAL TO ATTILA THE HUN 74–
77 (2004). 
 86 See HELD, supra note 82, at 28. See generally GRAEBER, supra note 61, at 
345. For a comprehensive treatment of the history of Roman institutions, see gen-
erally FRANK FROST ABBOTT, A HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF ROMAN 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (3d ed. 1911). 
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did not empower the people with any authentic mechanisms of self-
governance, but rather used the people as pawns in their own power 
struggles.87 
B. Modern Democracy 
Throughout history, most leaders and governments, including 
the Roman senators, did not adopt Pericles’ enthusiastic view of de-
mocracy, but rather viewed it disparagingly and derogatorily as a 
form of government that indicated mob rule, “political disorder, ri-
oting, lynching, and factional violence.”88 Still, instances of democ-
racy in the procedural sense occurred in most, if not all, cultures 
across history, particularly at the local level and with respect to spe-
cific episodes of collective decision making.89 However, democracy 
in the substantive sense was basically repudiated everywhere. 
It was only in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries 
that democracy in the substantive sense took on the positive conno-
tation it has today.90 Still, on the ground there was not much rule of 
the people.91 Even the political regime produced by the American 
Revolution—and later celebrated in 1863 by Abraham Lincoln in 
the Gettysburg Address as being “of the people, by the people, [and] 
for the people”92—was modeled on the republic of pre-imperial 
Rome rather than Pericles’ democracy: it was (and still is) a mixed 
constitution that balanced monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic 
elements.93 It envisioned a powerful, indirectly elected president, a 
                                                                                                             
 87 See MANUS I. MIDLARSKY, THE EVOLUTION OF INEQUALITY: WAR, STATE 
SURVIVAL, AND DEMOCRACY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 151–52 (1999). 
 88 GRAEBER, supra note 61, at 330, 345. 
 89 See id. at 356; Francis Dupuis-Déri, The Political Power of Words: The 
Birth of Pro-democratic Discourse in the Nineteenth Century in the United States 
and France, 52 POL. STUD. 118, 120–23 (2004); see also Roberts, supra note 78, 
at 82–83. 
 90 See GRAEBER, supra note 61, at 330–31; Dupuis-Déri, supra note 89, at 
118; John Markoff, Where and When Was Democracy Invented?, 41 COMP. STUD. 
SOC’Y & HIST. 660, 663–65 (1999). 
 91 See Dupuis-Déri, supra note 89, at 121. 
 92 Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in THE 
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2004, at 1335, 1335 (William A. 
McGeveran et al. eds., 2004). 
 93 GRAEBER, supra note 61, at 345; see Ellen Meiksins Wood, Demos Versus 
“We, the People”: Freedom and Democracy Ancient and Modern, in 
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house representing the people, and a deliberative, indirectly elected 
senate representing the states.94 As Markoff has noted, even the rev-
olutionary elites that 
called themselves democrats at the tail end of the 
eighteenth century were likely to be very suspicious 
of parliaments, downright hostile to competitive po-
litical parties, critical of secret ballots, uninterested 
or even opposed to women’s suffrage, and some-
times tolerant of slavery.95 
In addition, because modern nation-states, unlike ancient Athens 
and more similarly to Rome, were far too large to be directly ruled 
by their people, institutional agents were created to mediate the de-
cisions and actions of citizens and to resolve conflicts between 
them.96 These mediating agents took different forms, and demo-
cratic polities became more or less representative rather than di-
rect.97 In most cases where the people could be said to rule at all, 
they ruled only indirectly by occasionally voting for their represent-
atives—often with unequal voting power.98 In the United States, for 
                                                                                                             
DĒMOKRATIA: A CONVERSATION ON DEMOCRACIES, ANCIENT AND MODERN, su-
pra note 75, at 121, 124–29, 131–35; see also Markoff, supra note 90, at 665. 
 94 GRAEBER, supra note 61, at 345; see Wood, supra note 93, at 124–29, 131–
35. 
 95 Markoff, supra note 90, at 661. See generally Dupuis-Déri, supra note 89, 
at 120–31. 
 96 See Wood, supra note 93, at 124–29. 
 97 See id. This loss in direct control opens the door to concentration of un-
checked power and rent-seeking by representatives. One solution was to fragment 
power by institutional architecture, separating legislation from execution and ad-
judication. The idea was to restrict the authority of each branch of the government 
by pitting it against the independent authority of each of the other branches. See 
Peter M. Shane, Executive Branch Self-Policing in Times of Crisis: The Chal-
lenges for Conscientious Analysis, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY & POL’Y 507, 519 (2012). 
Though both the Greeks and the Romans had already introduced various forms of 
separation of powers in their political systems, modern democracy (especially in 
the United States) made separation of powers into one of its structural corner-
stones. See id. Much inspiration came from the French intellectual Montesquieu’s 
theory of “checks and balances”. See 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF 
LAWS 185–98 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., The Legal Classics Library ed. 1984) 
(1748) 
 98 See Wood, supra note 93, at 124–29; see also McAuliff et al., supra note 
46. 
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example, the principle of one person/one vote was not established 
until the 1960s by a series of Supreme Court decisions.99 
By the nineteenth-century in the West, elected legislatures had 
acquired unprecedented sway against hereditary and class lineages, 
unprecedented numbers of people were enfranchised, and politicians 
were increasingly forced to court small farmers and urban workers 
for their votes.100 It was only at this juncture that government leaders 
began to portray themselves as heirs to Pericles and speak of his 
democracy as embodying an honorable ideal of public participation 
rather than an incubus of violent mob rule.101 
The democratic narrative became that of a political regime char-
acterized by ordinary folks collectively managing their own affairs, 
informed by an egalitarian distribution of political power, and sus-
tained by ongoing participation.102 Whatever the case on the ground, 
this narrative conquered the hearts and minds of people the world 
over and has established democracy as a central political value in 
the twentieth- and now the twenty-first centuries.103 
IV. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
What has most strongly powered and sustained the democratic 
narrative, best reaffirmed and expanded the values of liberty and 
equality that Pericles trumpeted almost two millennia earlier, and 
reinforced popular demands and hopes that the democratic narrative 
                                                                                                             
 99 The central Supreme Court decisions are Baker v. Carr in 1962 and Reyn-
olds v. Sims in 1964. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (holding that chal-
lenges to legislative redistricting under the Equal Protection Clause of the Consti-
tution are justiciable); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that 
the Equal Protection Clause requires state legislature seats to be apportioned based 
on the state’s population and must give equal weight to one vote for every one 
person). Even today, voting power is highly variable depending on where one 
lives. For one way of calculating voting power, see Richie Bernardo, 2016’s States 
with the Most and Least Powerful Voters, WALLETHUB (Oct. 17, 2016), https://
wallethub.com/edu/how-much-is-your-vote-worth/7932/. 
 100 GRAEBER, supra note 61, at 345. 
 101 See Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Athenian Democracy: Modern Mythmakers 
and Ancient Theorists, 26 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 486, 487–88 (1993). 
 102 See the discussion of John Dewey infra Part IV. 
 103 See Amartya Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, 10 J. DEMOCRACY 3, 
3–4, 10–16 (1999). 
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would be realized in practice was the rise of the ideal of liberal de-
mocracy. While other countries had anticipated and advocated lib-
eral democracy,104 it became especially influential in the United 
States in the 1920s with the work of John Dewey.105 
Dewey’s vision was of democracy as a collective experiment 
conducted by citizens through informed dialogue.106 His democratic 
ideal depicts citizens approaching collective governance in the open, 
impartial, and empirically sensitive way that is characteristic of 
modern science.107 For the experiment to succeed, citizens must be 
free, educated, and (at least to some degree) self-realized.108 Democ-
racy is not just a decision procedure, but a “way of life”: 
[t]he key-note of democracy as a way of life . . . [is] 
the necessity for the participation of every mature hu-
man being in formation of the values that regulate the 
living of men together:–which is necessary from the 
standpoint of both the general social welfare and the 
full development of human beings as individuals.109 
                                                                                                             
 104 The great precursors of liberal democracy were John Stuart Mill (1859 and 
1861) and Immanuel Kant. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL 
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, 
PART I (John Ladd trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1999) (1797); see infra text 
accompanying note 110. 
 105 For a sharp and concise statement of Dewey’s political philosophy, see 2 
JOHN DEWEY, The Public and Its Problems [hereinafter The Public and Its Prob-
lems], in JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, at 235, 238–39 (Jo Ann 
Boydston & Bridget A. Walsh eds., 1984). For a discussion on Dewey’s role in 
the development of American democracy, see generally ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, 
JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ix–xviii (1991); ALAN RYAN, JOHN 
DEWEY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 19–34 (1995); DAVID 
FOTT, JOHN DEWEY: AMERICA’S PHILOSOPHER OF DEMOCRACY 1 (1998). 
 106 Richard J. Bernstein, Creative Democracy—The Task Still Before Us, 21 
AM. J. THEOLOGY & PHIL. 215, 217 (2000). 
 107 See id. 
 108 See id. at 217–21. 
 109 11 JOHN DEWEY, Democracy and Educational Administration, in JOHN 
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, at 217, 217–18 (Jo Ann Boydston et al. 
eds., 2008). In thinking of democracy as a way of life, Dewey was following Mill 
who wrote that a democratic political system makes the best use of the “moral, 
intellectual, and active worth already existing, so as to operate with the greatest 
effect on public affairs” and fosters the “advancement of the community . . . in 
intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency” more fully than any 
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Dewey was an egalitarian, a vigorous defender of civil liberties, and 
an advocate for unions and progressive public education.110 He 
thought that if democracy was to succeed, it was incumbent on gov-
ernment to create the conditions under which it could thrive.111 
Dewey’s kind of comprehensive liberalism is often regarded as 
democracy’s natural home. As Pericles and Aristotle recognized, 
once a value like eleutheria (individual liberty) has been accepted, 
a large step has been taken towards also accepting popular sover-
eignty. For without popular sovereignty, individuals would be relin-
quishing some of their liberty to an uncontrolled power that may not, 
in fact, serve their needs. 
Yet liberalism and democracy are distinct intellectual traditions 
with different histories, whose respective priorities do not always 
overlap. As Thomas Nagel writes: 
Liberalism [by which he means liberal democracy in 
our sense] is the conjunction of two ideals. The first 
is that of individual liberty: liberty of thought, 
speech, religion, and political action; freedom from 
government interference with privacy, personal life, 
and the exercise of individual inclination. The second 
ideal is that of a democratic society controlled by its 
citizens and serving their needs . . . . To approach 
either of these ideals is very difficult. To pursue both 
of them inevitably results in serious dilemmas.112 
Democracy’s primary commitment is to popular sovereignty, while 
liberalism primarily values individual liberty.113 
                                                                                                             
other political system. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 27–28 (Curren V. Shields ed., Bobbs-Merrill 
Co., Inc. 1958) (1861). 
 110 See Bernstein, supra note 106, at 217–18, 220. See generally James 
Gouinlock, Introduction to 2 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, su-
pra note 109, at ix, ix–xxxvi; John J. McDermott, Introduction to 11 JOHN 
DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, supra note 109, at xi, xi–xxxii. 
 111 See Bernstein, supra note 106 at 217, 220, 226. 
 112 Thomas Nagel, Libertarianism Without Foundations, 85 YALE L.J. 136, 
136 (1975) (reviewing ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974)). 
 113 See CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 2–3 (2000). The work 
of Daniel Bell explores the relationships between democracy, human rights, and 
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The problem is that popular sovereignty can be realized at the 
expense of individual liberty, and individual liberty can frustrate 
popular sovereignty. These conflicts can break out in a glaring way 
in cases signaled by the expression “tyranny of the majority.”114 In 
a system in which having the numbers means getting what you want, 
the door is open for oppressive legislation over those who do not 
have the numbers.115 Those may be the rich minority, as feared by 
Aristotle, the Roman senators, and later by American President 
James Madison;116 or the educated minority, as Plato and Mill sug-
gested;117 or some ethnic and cultural minority, as the Jews of dem-
ocratically constituted Nazi Germany tragically learned.118 
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BELL, EAST MEETS WEST: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN EAST ASIA 158–
215 (2000). 
 114 The phrase “tyranny of the majority” was first used by John Adams. JOHN 
ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
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SERIOUSLY 163–84, 223–48, 311–18 (1977). 
 115 Dewey’s great interlocutor, Walter Lippmann, wrote that “an election 
based on the principle of majority rule is historically and practically a sublimated 
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 116 See HELD, supra note 82, at 15–17; ABBOTT, supra note 86, at 77–80; THE 
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 117 See HELD, supra note 82, at 23–27; MILL, supra note 109, at 135–43. 
 118 See MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 56, at 83–84, 109. 
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Liberal democracy’s solution to the conflict between popular 
sovereignty and liberal ideals (such as liberty itself) is to construct 
independent institutions whose role is to protect liberal values, often 
in the form of rights to liberty of expression, property, freedom of 
association, and so on.119 By adopting constitutions, bills of rights, 
courts, expert bodies, administrative procedures and other mecha-
nisms, liberal democracy protects and promotes a range of values 
(including competence and efficiency) that are often neglected or 
put at risk by more immediately majoritarian forms of democracy.120 
These mechanisms buffer popular influence. They insulate law and 
policy (at least to some extent) from the transient opinions of citi-
zens. Ironically, and perhaps paradoxically, liberal democracy pro-
tects liberal values by limiting popular sovereignty. In this very spe-
cific but important sense, these buffering mechanisms (constitu-
tions, bills of rights, courts, expert bodies, administrative proce-
dures, etc.), which are part-constitutive of liberal democracy, are 
themselves non-democratic. 
Whatever their ironies and paradoxes, liberal democracies have 
considerable strengths. One strength is their capacity to ensure that 
the needs and interests of citizens are taken into consideration during 
collective decision making, while at the same time providing a clear 
way (i.e., majority rule) to make decisions even in the face of disa-
greement.121 Liberal democracies are inclusive and can be efficient, 
                                                                                                             
 119 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 265–66 (James Madison) (Ian 
Shapiro ed., 2009) (“It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the 
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society 
against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in dif-
ferent classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights 
of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against 
this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the major-
ity—that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so 
many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a 
majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable.”). 
 120 For discussion of the great variation that exists among liberal democracies 
with respect to these institutions, see generally HELD, supra note 82, at 1–8, 123–
256, 275–84. 
 121 Cf. The Public and Its Problems, supra note 105, at 364 (“The strongest 
point to be made in behalf of even such rudimentary political forms as democracy 
has already attained, popular voting, majority rule and so on, is that to some extent 
they involve a consultation and discussion which uncover social needs and trou-
bles.”). 
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at least relative to some alternatives. In addition, liberal democracy 
realizes some forms of equality; this may be because democracy is 
a peaceful and fair compromise among bearers of conflicting claims, 
realized by each having an equal say over decision making,122 or 
because democracy “publicly embodies the equal advancement of 
the interests of the citizens of a society when there is disagreement 
about how best to organize their shared life.”123 A further strength 
of liberal democracy is its capacity to harness the precious resource 
of diffused knowledge: the fragmentation of decisional powers that 
characterize democratic regimes promotes an increase in decisional 
competence of the system as a whole.124 Yet another strength of de-
mocracy is its capacity to contribute to the development and exercise 
of fine human capacities including initiative, engagement, self-reli-
ance, rational thinking, autonomy, and respect for others.125 
Other strengths of democracy become apparent on the assump-
tion that all people are (born or created) free.126 Once this idea is 
accepted, democracy appears to be the only (or at least the most) 
legitimate form of government. In a democracy, citizens can freely 
author their own laws through collective decision-making. Consid-
ering the extent to which laws affect the lives of individuals, it is 
only when individuals can be said to be the authors of such laws, as 
democracy allows them to be, that individuals can really be said to 
be masters of their own lives as liberalism maintains that they are 
and should be. 
                                                                                                             
 122 See generally PETER SINGER, DEMOCRACY AND DISOBEDIENCE 30–41 
(1973); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 235–39 (1999). 
 123 Tom Christiano, Democracy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. § 2.2.3 (Edward 
N. Zalta ed., 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/. 
 124 See generally MILL, supra note 109, at 25–28; JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC 
AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL INQUIRY 171–205 (Melvin L. Rogers 
ed., 2016) (1927). 
 125 See MILL, supra note 109, at 27–30; see also Jon Elster, The Market and 
the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
DEMOCRACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 138, 152 (Thomas Christiano ed., 2003). 
 126 E.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); G.A. Res. 
217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). This as-
sumption is widely shared by liberals, but often in the breach as we see from the 
existence of slavery in societies that claim to be liberal. See generally GERALD F. 
GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM: AN ESSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 161, 162–66 (1996) (discussing the normative primacy of lib-
erty for liberals). 
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V. DEMOCRACY’S VULNERABILITIES 
Despite these strengths, democracy in all its forms is subject to 
numerous vulnerabilities. Many of these vulnerabilities were known 
in the ancient world and were also discussed by modern philoso-
phers. In Part IV, we mentioned one particular vulnerability: the risk 
to individual liberty that democracy can present. In this Part, we dis-
cuss three further vulnerabilities of democracy: a lack of governance 
expertise, voter ignorance, and instability. 
A. Lack of Governance Expertise 
Plato saw major problems in democracy and thought that these 
problems were guaranteed to drive democracies towards demagogu-
ery and tyranny.127 His general worry was that democracy under-
mines governance expertise because it requires those who run for 
office to develop and exercise a different set of skills than those re-
quired for good governance; namely, skills functional to the harness-
ing of votes to win elections.128 Metaphorically equating a polity to 
a ship, a competent ruler (by which Plato meant a philosopher) to a 
captain, and citizens to sailors, Plato wrote: 
They throng about the captain, begging and praying 
him to commit the helm to them . . . . Him who is 
their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for 
getting the ship out of the captain’s hands into their 
own whether by force or persuasion, they compli-
ment with the name of sailor, pilot, able seaman, and 
abuse the other sort of man, whom they call a good-
for-nothing; but that the true pilot must pay attention 
to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds, 
and whatever else belongs to his art, if he intends to 
be really qualified for the command of a ship, and 
that he must and will be the steerer, whether other 
                                                                                                             
 127 See PLATO, Despotism and the Despotic Man [hereinafter Despotism and 
the Despotic Man], in THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 287, 288 (Francis Macdonald 
Cornford trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1945) (1941). Plato’s classic critique of de-
mocracy is in Book VIII of The Republic. Plato, The Republic: Book VIII, 
INTERNET CLASSIC ARCHIVE (last visited Dec. 18, 2017), http://clas-
sics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.9.viii.html [hereinafter Book VIII]. 
 128 See Christiano, supra note 123, at § 2.1.2. 
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people like or not—the possibility of this union of 
authority with the steerer’s art has never seriously en-
tered into their thoughts or been made part of their 
calling.129 
Plato had controversial and even conceited views about democ-
racy, but here he seems to make a structural rather than ideological 
point. Democracy does not ultimately require governance profi-
ciency as a condition for running for or holding office: it only re-
quires that offices be won by popular vote. There is no reason to 
believe that those who are proficient at winning elections are profi-
cient at governing.130 
Plato also doubted the governance abilities of the people.131 He 
suspected that it was not congenial to most people to engage in the 
disciplined training required to understand enough of the world and 
oneself to be competent self-governors.132 Ultimately, Plato thought 
most people want to be left alone, attend to their business and crafts, 
and enjoy themselves as they please.133 Worse still, people can be 
pleased by all sorts of things in erratic and inconsistent ways. Here 
is Plato’s description of “the democratic man”: 
                                                                                                             
 129 Plato, The Republic: Book VI, INTERNET CLASSIC ARCHIVE (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2017), http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.7.vi.html [hereinafter Book 
VI]. 
 130 It has become a trope in recent politics that Republicans are good at win-
ning elections and terrible at governing, while Democrats are good at governing 
but bad at winning elections. See Julia Azari, Why Republicans Can’t Govern, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 11, 2017, 5:56 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/fea-
tures/why-republicans-cant-govern/; Harry Enten, Democrats Shouldn’t Count on 
an Unpopular Trump to Win Back Governorships, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 2, 
2016, 7:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/democrats-shouldnt-count-
on-an-unpopular-trump-to-win-back-governorships/. 
 131 See PLATO, The Philosopher King [hereinafter The Philosopher King], in 
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 127, at 175, 175–263; PLATO, Democracy 
and the Democratic Man [hereinafter Democracy and the Democratic Man], in 
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 127, at 279, 284–86. 
 132 See Democracy and the Democratic Man, supra note 131, at 279, 284–86. 
See generally The Philosopher King, supra note 131, at 175, 175–263. 
 133 This is an important theme in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. See PLATO, The 
Allegory of the Cave, in THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 127, at 227, 227–
35. 
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[H]e lives from day to day indulging the appetite of 
the hour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and 
strains of the flute; then he becomes a water-drinker, 
and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnas-
tics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, 
then once more living the life of a philosopher; often 
he is busy with politics, and starts to his feet and says 
and does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is 
emulous of anyone who is a warrior, off he is in that 
direction, or of men of business, once more in that. 
His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted 
existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom; and so 
he goes on.134 
A people composed of such inconsistent and undisciplined indi-
viduals, Plato thought, is prone to miscalculate priorities and may 
also be easily manipulated by those who have the will, ability, and 
means.135 The result may be that the interests most tended to may 
not be the people’s but rather those advanced by the groups or indi-
viduals best organized and equipped to perpetrate the manipula-
tion.136 
Plato may have been overly pessimistic about “the democratic 
man” and unduly deterministic in predicting democracy’s inevitable 
path towards demagoguery and tyranny.137 Yet even an otherwise 
critical reader cannot entirely ignore the aptness of Plato’s ship met-
aphor when observing the current rise of populist figures or move-
ments in contemporary liberal democracies. Much like “him who is 
their partisan and cleverly aids them in their plot for getting the ship 
                                                                                                             
 134 Book VIII, supra note 127. 
 135 See Democracy and the Democratic Man, supra note 131, at 279, 284–86. 
See generally The Philosopher King, supra note 131, at 175, 175–263. 
 136 See Book VI, supra note 129. Plato had witnessed the feats of Alcibiades—
a rich, persuasive, and reckless young man––who, during the Peloponnesian war 
against Sparta, convinced the Athenians to embark on the most ambitious mari-
time assault the city had ever attempted against Syracuse in Eastern Sicily, an ally 
and main food supplier of Sparta. The expedition was a failure and marked the 
beginning of Athens’ defeat in the war and overall decline. Russell Meiggs, Alci-
biades, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Al-
cibiades-Athenian-politician-and-general (last updated June 28, 2017). 
 137 Democracy and the Democratic Man, supra note 131, at 279–86; Despot-
ism and the Despotic Man, supra note 127, at 287–88; Book VI, supra note 129. 
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out of the captain’s hands into their own,” these figures or move-
ments often present themselves as the people’s champions, are skill-
ful in harnessing votes, rail against the current inefficacy of demo-
cratic institutions in tackling urgent problems, and boast about their 
own powers while also downplaying or even denying the im-
portance of experts for good governance.138 
B. Voter Ignorance 
Another vulnerability of democracy that has worried commen-
tators since its invention is voter ignorance. Whatever failures citi-
zens may have with respect to governance may seem to be magni-
fied by their high levels of ignorance.139 
Plato was first in line here,140 but champions of democracy who 
had a much more optimistic view of “the democratic man,” such as 
John Stuart Mill, also had concerns about voter ignorance.141 While 
an advocate of universal suffrage, Mill proposed that people with 
university degrees and intellectually demanding jobs be given extra 
votes.142 While most democrats today would recoil in horror from 
such a suggestion, many democracies have in fact welcomed it in 
some way. For example, until 1950, some British universities had 
their own parliamentary constituencies, thus effectively allowing the 
educated to vote twice—once at their university and once in their 
place of residency.143 The Italian Senate still includes “life sena-
                                                                                                             
 138 See Book VI, supra note 129; Marquand, supra note 56. 
 139 See generally DANNY OPPENHEIMER & MIKE EDWARDS, DEMOCRACY 
DESPITE ITSELF: WHY A SYSTEM THAT SHOULDN’T WORK AT ALL WORKS SO 
WELL 89–90 (2012). For specific examples regarding the ignorance of Americans, 
see JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD & KATHERINE LEVINE EINSTEIN, DO FACTS 
MATTER?: INFORMATION AND MISINFORMATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 16–17 
(2015). 
 140 Plato’s critique is echoed by Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev, “Stalin was 
supported by the majority of the Soviet people both because he was clever enough 
to deceive them and because they were backward enough to be deceived.” ROY 
MEDVEDEV, LET HISTORY JUDGE: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
STALINISM 712 (George Shriver ed., trans., 1989). 
 141 See MILL, supra note 109, at 127–47. 
 142 Id. at 135–38. 
 143 See Caleb Crain, The Case Against Democracy, NEW YORKER (Nov. 7, 
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/07/the-case-against-de-
mocracy. 
398 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:369 
 
tors—who are appointed by the President of the Republic ‘for out-
standing merits in the social, scientific, artistic or literary field.’”144 
In the United States, voter literacy tests have never been definitively 
banned, though they are not currently used in any jurisdiction.145 
John Dewey took the issue of voter ignorance as a reason to in-
sist on the central political importance of education in and for de-
mocracies, as well as of a free press that would help circulate infor-
mation.146 Others took an entirely different approach. For example, 
Joseph Schumpeter’s elitist theory has it that democratic political 
leaders should make policy and law with little regard for citizens’ 
opinions and even demands, since these are fickle and incoherent.147 
This effectively excludes citizens from governing and restricts their 
role to confirming or rejecting political leaders—still a significant, 
but clearly quite limited form of popular sovereignty. 
Voter ignorance is hardly a surprise. Public choice theorists have 
argued that citizens will typically not be well-informed about polit-
ical issues, nor particularly motivated to gather relevant infor-
mation—rationally so, given the virtually null impact of any single 
vote on the outcomes of elections.148 Some political scientists and 
economists, while acknowledging voter ignorance, have claimed 
                                                                                                             
 144 Parliament, SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA, https://www.senato.it/3801(last 
visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
 145 Historically literacy tests in the United States were used to disenfranchise 
minorities, especially African-Americans. Primary Documents in American His-
tory: 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://
www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/15thamendment.html (last visited Dec. 24, 
2017). Since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 a body of law has developed to prevent 
literacy tests from being used for this purpose. See id. 
 146 See generally The Public and Its Problems, supra note 105, 325–72; 
LIPPMANN, supra note 115, at 12–29 (demonstrating skepticism that education 
could remedy the ills of democracy). 
 147 See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY 250–68 (3d ed. 1950). 
 148 See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238–
59 (1957); Harry Cheadle, An Expert Explains Why Your Vote Won’t Matter, VICE 
(Aug. 29, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/avaek4/voters-
dont-know-anything-and-your-vote-wont-matter. However, in the 2018 election, 
control of the Virginia House of Delegates turned on a single vote. Ian Simpson, 
Democrat loses bid to overturn tie in key Virginia House race, REUTERS (Jan. 3, 
2018, 1:08 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-virginia-election/democrat-
loses-bid-to-overturn-tie-in-key-virginia-house-race-idUSKBN1ES1NP. 
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that it is not a problem, as indicated by the successes of democ-
racy.149 Various explanations have been put forward about how 
voter ignorance and successful governance manage to peacefully co-
exist.150 Some theorists are in thrall to ideas about the “wisdom of 
crowds.”151 On this view, epistemologically compromised people 
make better decisions collectively than they would individually.152 
Knowledge and experience does lead voters to revise their pref-
erences.153 Moreover, how we feel about decisions made from igno-
rance might depend on what the alternatives are.154 In my case, what 
we know from analyses of the 2016 United States presidential elec-
tion is that voters’ sense of identity drove their voting behavior more 
than knowledge of the issues or policy preferences anyway.155 
From here, it is easy to see how voter ignorance can be seen as 
a problem, one that is especially relevant to the recent rise of popu-
list figures and movements in liberal democracies, at least insofar as 
voter ignorance can be manipulated as well as fomented.156 For ex-
ample, voter ignorance is manipulated when debaters rely on cha-
risma, pathos and inflammatory rhetoric, rather than fact-based, 
coolly-reasoned discourse.157 It is fomented when contestation of 
the role of experts is promoted—an issue to which we shall return 
in Section VI.D. 
                                                                                                             
 149 See generally OPPENHEIMER & EDWARDS, supra note 139, at 9–38, 177–
202, 223–30; MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN 
NATIONAL ELECTIONS 4–5 (1981). 
 150 See generally FIORINA, supra note 149, at 3–19. 
 151 The idea of the “wisdom of crowds” was first put forward by Francis Gal-
ton, and popularized recently by James Surowiecki. See generally Francis Galton, 
Vox Populi, 75 NATURE 450, 451 (1907); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF 
CROWDS xi–xv, 269–71 (2004). 
 152 See generally Galton, supra note 151, at 451. 
 153 See HOCHSCHILD & EINSTEIN, supra note 139, at 23–27. 
 154 See generally OPPENHEIMER & EDWARDS, supra note 139, at 119–32. 
 155 See generally John Sides et al., The 2016 U.S. Election: How Trump Lost 
and Won, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 34, 34–37 (2017). 
 156 See MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 56, at 62–68, 103–04. 
 157 See id. at 63–68 (discussing the exploitation of charisma by populist fig-
ures). For a glossary of pathos-based rhetorics, see Richard Nordquist, Pathos 
(Rethoric): Glossary of Grammatical and Rhetorical Terms, THOUGHTCO. (last 
updated Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.thoughtco.com/pathos-rhetoric-1691598. 
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C. Instability 
Thomas Hobbes identified instability as another vulnerability of 
democracy.158 Indeed, Hobbes thought that democracy, though in-
deed a distinct form of government, was not much of an improve-
ment upon the anarchic state of nature as it tended to replicate rather 
than neutralize important drivers of the war of all against all, includ-
ing competition and vanity.159 For this reason, a democracy is con-
stantly at risk of relapsing into anarchy or turning into an “aristoc-
racy of orators, interrupted sometimes with the temporary monarchy 
of one orator.”160 
Democracy fosters competition because legislating in a democ-
racy is such an inclusive enterprise. Politicians, as well as citizens, 
will tend not to feel personally responsible for the quality of legis-
lation, insofar as no one among the voters or their representatives 
singularly makes any significant difference to the outcomes of leg-
islation.161 In this way, the concerns of citizens as well as politicians 
will be deflected from the common good and instead fixed onto the 
competition for power and the pursuit of partisan or private inter-
ests.162 
Democracy fosters vanity because it holds out the promise that 
each citizen can promote his or her own interests through the politi-
cal process.163 Hobbes says that “in such great assemblies, as those 
must be, whereinto every man may enter at his pleasure,” everyone 
is given the hope that he may “incline and sway the assembly to [his] 
own ends.”164 Because of “the desire of praise which is bred in hu-
man nature,” each citizen will indulge “the opportunity to sh[o]w 
                                                                                                             
 158 Alan Apperley, Hobbes on Democracy, 19 POLITICS 165, 168 (1999). 
 159 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 86–90, 129–37 (Richard Tuck ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press rev. student ed. 1996) (1651) [hereinafter LEVIATHAN]; 
Apperley, supra note 158, at 166–69. 
 160 THOMAS HOBBES, De Corpore Politico, or the Elements of Law [hereinaf-
ter De Corpore], in 4 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES OF 
MALMESBURTY 77, 141 (William Molesworth ed., London, John Bohn 1840); ac-
cord Apperley, supra note 158, at 166–69. 
 161 See Christiano, supra note 123, at § 2.1.2. 
 162 See LEVIATHAN, supra note 158, at 131; Apperley, supra note 158, at 168–
69. 
 163 Apperley, supra note 158, at 168–69. 
 164 De Corpore, supra note 160, at 141. 
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their wisdom, knowledge, and eloquence, in deliberating matters of 
the greatest difficulty and moment.”165 
Competition and vanity are the ingredients of political resent-
ment.166 Democracy cannot fulfill the promise to promote the inter-
ests of each citizen through the political process.167 For in any policy 
decision, only a fraction of the population—e.g., the numerical ma-
jority, with the minority discontented, or some powerful numerical 
minority, with the majority discontented—will see its interests pro-
moted by democratic rule.168 In other words, citizens of democracies 
always stand a good chance of seeing their hopes frustrated. When 
they feel that their hopes have been frustrated too often or too bla-
tantly, these citizens, who are both competitive and vain, may come 
to feel alienated from the outcomes of legislation or marginalized by 
the political process.169 This may breed resentment towards both.170 
Hobbes’ points seem relevant to the current rise of populist fig-
ures and movements in liberal democracies. These figures or move-
ments exploit and promote an increasingly competitive factionalism. 
Further, they build on real as well as perceived neglect of citizens’ 
interests by emphasizing the disappointments of current outcomes 
and processes, while courting the related popular resentment 
through vivid, visceral, and even uncivil expressions of disagree-
ment.171 They typically attack “systems of governance with long and 
opaque chains of delegation,” which they promise to overhaul.172 
VI. THE INTERLOCKING CRISES 
In this Part, we highlight how the vulnerabilities of democracy 
are made salient as well as exacerbated by climate change and other 
problems of the Anthropocene. We also emphasize how climate 
                                                                                                             
 165 THOMAS HOBBES, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Law and Society: 
Dominion, in 2 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURTY 63, 
136 (William Molesworth ed., London, John Bohn 1841). 
 166 See Apperley, supra note 158, at 168–69. See generally Christiano, supra 
note 123, at § 2.1.2. 
 167 See id. 
 168 See Apperley, supra note 158, at 168 (1999). 
 169 See id. at 168–69. 
 170 See id. 
 171 See generally id. 
 172 Jamieson & Di Paola, supra note 4, at 274. 
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change and other problems of the Anthropocene place democracies 
that attempt to navigate them in a particularly impervious Scylla and 
Charybdis-like situation.173 The Scylla is ineffective policy; the 
Charybdis is some relaxation of the core democratic principle of 
popular sovereignty. Both options seem nearly guaranteed to trigger 
significant legitimacy challenges to liberal democratic systems. 
Traditionally, two important sources of democratic legitimacy 
have been beneficial consequences, in the utilitarian tradition, and 
consent, in the social contract tradition.174 Whatever else may count 
as beneficial consequences, the capacity to solve problems that 
threaten the physical and social security of citizens is a central and 
important source of democratic legitimacy.175 Call this the “public 
utility” view of democratic legitimacy. And whatever else may 
count as consent, surely the fact that the majority of citizens have 
expressed their preference for a certain candidate, law, or policy is 
an important source of democratic legitimacy as well.176 Call this 
the “expressed preference” view of democratic legitimacy. 
Consider public utility first. As we have pointed out, most con-
temporary democracies have thus far failed to address the emerging 
problems of the Anthropocene.177 Consequently, the sense of phys-
ical and social insecurity grows more acute amongst citizens as the 
                                                                                                             
 173 Scylla and Charybdis were mythical sea monsters mentioned by Homer in 
the Odyssey. They were sited on opposite sides of the Strait of Messina between 
Sicily and the Italian mainland, and located close enough to each other that pass-
ing sailors avoiding Charybdis had to pass too close to Scylla and vice versa. 
HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 157–68 (E. V. Rieu trans., Penguin Classics 2003) (c. 800 
B.C.E.). 
 174 See Fabienne Peter, Political Legitimacy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/#
SouPolLeg. See generally Julia Driver, The History of Utilitarianism, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/utilitarianism-history/; Ann Cudd & Seena Eftekhari, Contractarianism, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2017), https://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/contractarianism/; Apperley, supra note 158, at 167. 
 175 See generally Apperley, supra note 158, at 167–68; Driver, supra note 174. 
 176 See generally Apperley, supra note 158, at 167–68; Cudd & Eftekhari, 
supra note 174. 
 177 See generally JAMIESON, supra note at 5, at 34–59. 
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problems mount and compound.178 The legitimacy of these democ-
racies, and the supranational institutions they have created, such as 
the European Union and the United Nations, is thus compromised 
on public utility grounds. 
Now consider expressed preference. The global scope, long-
term reach, unprecedented features, and highly complex nature of 
climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene require de-
mocracies to make robust commitments to multilateral cooperation, 
long-term planning, significant deviations from the status quo, and 
increased reliance on expert knowledge if they are to succeed in 
managing these problems.179 Citizens’ expressed preferences may 
be quite distant from this network of commitments and activities,180 
since the benefits of successfully managing a problem like climate 
change would mostly accrue not to these citizens, but to spatiotem-
porally distant people (i.e., the global poor and future generations) 
and genetically distant (non-human) nature.181 Attempting to force 
such commitments, especially at a time when democracies are al-
ready being accused of not being responsive enough to their citizens, 
can further compromise legitimacy.182 
We thus face an apparent dilemma: if democracies fail to suc-
cessfully address climate change and other problems of the Anthro-
pocene, their legitimacy will be challenged on public utility 
grounds. If they aggressively attempt to address them, their legiti-
macy will likely be challenged on expressed preference grounds. Ei-
ther way, we can expect the power of populist figures and move-
ments to grow. 
The remainder of this Part illuminates this dilemma by discuss-
ing how climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene 
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interact with some further democratic vulnerabilities: weak multi-
lateralism, short-termism, the profusion of veto players, the con-
tested role of experts, and self-referring decision making. 
A. Weak Multilateralism 
Climate change cannot be successfully managed without a 
strong commitment to international cooperation.183 For a climate re-
gime to succeed, it must be effective, perceived as at least not unfair 
by all parties, and otherwise acceptable to each party.184 At various 
times, the attempt to create a regime has foundered on each of these 
three considerations.185 
From the beginning of the negotiations that led to the adoption 
of the FCCC in 1992 and in subsequent negotiations under the Con-
vention, the question of fairness has been unavoidable.186 When 
agreements have been structured in ways that are acceptable to de-
veloping countries (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol) they have been per-
ceived as unfair by the United States.187 This has led to the weaken-
ing of commitments and to a regime whose effectiveness is in ques-
tion.188 The Paris Agreement, by putting voluntary pledges at the 
center, was designed to avoid the problem of perceived unfair-
ness.189 It was reasonably thought that no party could say that they 
had been unfairly treated when they have agreed to be measured in 
relation to a commitment that they have voluntarily undertaken and 
to which no sanctions are attached for non-compliance.190 Neverthe-
less, that was exactly the claim made by President Trump in an-
nouncing his intention to withdraw the United States from the Paris 
Agreement.191 Moreover, the cost of creating an agreement to which 
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no one could reasonably object was to create an Agreement whose 
effectiveness was in question even before the United States an-
nounced its intention to withdraw.192 
While climate change is its own “full tragedy and weird com-
edy,” 193 there are structural issues at work.194 As the world order 
attempts to adjust to shifting power distributions following the 
emergence of new giants such as China and India, when it comes to 
problems such as climate change the cooperation of such countries 
is no longer just desirable but essential.195 As their collaboration be-
comes more valuable, the price for obtaining it rises accordingly.196 
This complicates negotiations, and the problem seems only destined 
to worsen because this logic applies not only to presently emerging 
world powers, but also to those that have already emerged and those 
that will emerge in the future. As we observed in an earlier paper, 
“[g]lobal governance in the Anthropocene is cooperation-hungry, 
and this increases the price of obtaining cooperation from every 
country.”197 
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In addition, democracies have their own particular problems 
when it comes to multilateral agreements. Except in the rare case 
where they are able to steer multilateral agreements in the way they 
prefer, democratic governments “often seek to avoid compliance 
with binding multilateral decisions if this weakens their relationship 
to their electorate.”198 This is in fact what happened in the case of 
President Trump’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement.199 The stated 
reason was the agreement’s unfairness to the United States.200 How-
ever, the deeper reason was that the Obama administration’s deci-
sion to join, although admittedly an act of national self-determina-
tion, was not in fact an authentic deliverance of American popular 
sovereignty, at least in the eyes of Trump and his supporters.201 Ac-
cording to Trump, 
[t]he Paris Climate Accord is simply the latest exam-
ple of Washington entering into an agreement that 
disadvantages the United States to the exclusive ben-
efit of other countries, leaving American workers – 
who [sic] I love – and taxpayers to absorb the cost in 
terms of lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories, 
and vastly diminished economic production.202 
In the same speech Trump reminded his audience that “I was elected 
to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris.”203 
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In democracies, it is ultimately citizens who empower their rep-
resentatives to bargain and strike terms of international coopera-
tion.204 Successfully addressing the problems of the Anthropocene 
is likely to require unprecedented levels of multilateralism.205 Dem-
ocratic states that attempt to rise to the challenge are likely to face 
legitimacy challenges on expressed preference grounds. Those that 
do not may face legitimacy challenges on public utility grounds. 
B. Short-termism 
Short-termism can be defined as “the priority given to present 
net benefits at the cost of future ones.”206 Short-termism is a problem 
whenever policy domains have an extended timeframe, as is the case 
with climate change and other systemic problems of the Anthropo-
cene.207 In these cases, present net benefits may need to be curtailed 
(through increases in taxes and regulations, for example) for the 
sake of benefits that might materialize in the distant future. These 
future benefits will then mostly advantage people other than those 
who have borne the costs. Reasons for privileging the present in 
these cases include pure time preference, uncertainty, and dimin-
ished or even null moral concern for those who might benefit in the 
future.208 The temptation, then, is to eschew the costs of the required 
policies and “pass the buck” to future generations.209 
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Short-termism is not always irrational nor morally wrong.210 It 
has been argued, however, that short-termism is both irrational and 
morally wrong in the case of climate change.211 The sources of 
short-termism are rooted in human psychology and can manifest in 
any kind of political regime.212 However, it has been argued that de-
mocracies are particularly vulnerable to short-termism.213 
One important reason for the short-termism of democratic polit-
ical regimes is that these regimes inherit, via voting and other forms 
of popular influence, their citizens’ biases in favor of the present. 
Policies may also reflect citizens’ misinformation about, or una-
wareness of, long-term processes, risks, policy aims, and possible 
outcomes.214 To counter these tendencies, liberal democracies typi-
cally filter their citizens’ inter-temporal biases, misinformation, and 
unawareness through such mechanisms as constitutions and reliance 
on expert bodies.215 Yet the more filtering they do, the more likely 
they are to incur legitimacy challenges on expressed preference 
grounds.216 This is a problem of intra-generational legitimacy.217 
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There are also problems of inter-generational legitimacy.218 
There is no guarantee that long-term policies, if enacted, will 
achieve the anticipated aims, or that they will indeed make future 
people better off by achieving these aims.219 If things do not work 
out, these policies might be deemed illegitimate on public utility 
grounds by the very future people that they were supposed to bene-
fit.220 In addition, such policies may be deemed illegitimate by fu-
ture people on expressed preference grounds.221 Legitimacy on ex-
pressed preference grounds typically requires some form of             
authorization by those who are affected by policies, yet future peo-
ple who will be affected by past policies never authorize them, nor 
can they hold anyone accountable.222 
Another reason for democracies’ short-termism is the schedul-
ing of participatory events.223 Democracy requires elections, which 
must be relatively frequent in order to ensure that people can regu-
larly express their will, vote out politicians who are judged to have 
failed in some important ways, and prevent rent-seeking behavior 
by not giving politicians enough time to set up camp within institu-
tions.224 However, the relatively short duration of electoral cycles 
ensures that politicians are constantly concerned with their own re-
election, and this may prevent them from taking hard policy deci-
sions that require a great deal of political capital and do not produce 
appreciable outcomes in time for the next election.225 Because most 
of the impacts of climate change will largely materialize in the fu-
ture and be felt by future generations, efforts at their alleviation must 
obey a clock that is not in sync with the electoral clock. 
Note that there is no need to assume that politicians are always 
and necessarily motivated by only a thirst for power.226 In a democ-
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racy, even politicians who are exclusively motivated by the aspira-
tion to make good long-term policy need to be elected or re-elected 
to do so.227 In order to be elected, they need to harness the votes of 
the current electorate.228 So, the problem of short-termism goes be-
yond a lack of conscientious far-sightedness on the side of politi-
cians: it is structurally connected to the very fact of popular sover-
eignty—at least as long as the majority of people discount the fu-
ture.229 
C. Veto Players 
Any political system (with the possible exclusion of some forms 
of anarchy) accords veto powers to some agent: a monarchy to the 
king, an aristocracy to the nobility, a technocracy to the experts, a 
theocracy to the religious leader, and so on.230 A veto player in a 
political system can be understood as an agent who can prevent a 
departure from the status quo.231 In democracies, veto players can 
be specified by constitutions (e.g., the President and the Congress in 
the United States), emerge from the political system (e.g., the Su-
preme Court in the United States, political parties that are members 
of a government coalition in Western Europe), or from civil society 
(e.g., powerful industries, unions or other interest groups in many 
countries).232 
In a democracy, veto players can protect minority interests, pre-
vent destabilizing change, and preserve important values and poli-
cies through periods in which they are unpopular.233 More generally, 
veto players prevent a democratic system from being excessively 
fluid and flexible.234 This is attractive when the status quo is desira-
ble or an exogenous shock is beneficial; however, when the status 
quo is undesirable or an exogenous shock disturbs a desirable status 
quo, fluidity and flexibility are needed in order to respond quickly 
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and decisively.235 This is arguably the situation in the case of climate 
change, which demands nimble political responses to which veto 
players would have to acquiesce. 
The presence of many veto players threatens to delay or even 
block the formulation and implementation of policy.236 Liberal de-
mocracies, with their reliance on checks and balances generated by 
institutional architecture or by competition among interest groups, 
seem particularly vulnerable to such threats—and the more veto 
players in a democracy the greater the degree of vulnerability.237 
An especially high concentration of veto players helps to explain 
why a powerful, rich, technological leader like the United States is 
uncannily slow to address consequential public issues such as the 
politics of distribution, racial equality, immigration, the proper bal-
ance between liberty and national security, and of course climate 
change.238 The United States Constitution separates powers in the 
federal government, reserves a broad range of powers to states and 
includes a bill of rights that can be viewed as effectively giving veto 
powers to individuals in some circumstances. Practices have also 
developed through time that inhibit action, such as requiring super-
majorities for some political decisions. 
The profusion of veto players may be extreme in the United 
States, but it is a feature common to many liberal democracies that 
often makes political action elusive even on relatively minor policy 
issues.239 For every possible policy change, there is always a “do-
nothing” alternative (sometimes more respectably presented as a 
“wait and see” alternative) that is invariably attractive to some veto 
player.240 
“Do-nothing” alternatives may sometimes be justified on 
grounds of rational choice considerations relating to transition costs 
and uncertainty about both the process of transition and the final 
pay-off structure.241 Veto players give voice to such considerations, 
as well as other considerations that we have already noted.242 But 
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veto players may also give voice to less rational tendencies, which 
are inevitably present and, in democracies, are crystallized in votes. 
Among these tendencies may be disproportionate attention to sunk 
costs, finding refuge in “what has always worked,” fear of regretting 
the changes made, the desire to maintain and transmit a sense of 
control by not acceding to the demands of new circumstances, and 
lack of trust in those who are proposing the changes.243 
Veto players tend to slow down or block deviations from the 
status quo, and this makes it difficult to tackle climate change and 
other similar problems of the Anthropocene.244 But veto players also 
reflect and configure real structures of power, and protect and pro-
mote the needs and interests of actual people.245 When the number 
of veto players or the importance of specific veto players is altered, 
new power structures emerge and this can raise legitimacy chal-
lenges on both utility and expressed preference grounds.246 It is not 
obvious what veto players should be eliminated or demoted in order 
to produce more nimble and effective climate policy, and which 
ones should be given additional power instead. Nor is it obvious who 
should decide the answers to these questions (if not the people) and 
on what grounds (if not majority rule). 
Veto players configure systems of checks and balances, filters 
and buffers, which are only partially exposed to popular influ-
ence.247 This anti-majoritarian service is particularly precious to lib-
eral democracies, which rely on veto players to protect and promote 
the rights of individuals and minorities—and, with that, the core lib-
eral principles of individual liberty and human rights. However, as 
a consequence, if a majority exists that is overwhelmingly con-
vinced by climate science, totally in favor of leaving all remaining 
fossil energy sources in the ground, and ready to embark on ambi-
tious renewable energy programs, this majority may still find it dif-
ficult to act. Liberal democracies protect minorities of various kinds 
in varying degrees, and these include climate change denialists and 
those who profit from fossil fuels. Economically powerful and en-
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trenched economic minorities (the “1%”) are often extremely effec-
tive veto players.248 This can prevent action that would benefit most 
people, thus increasing the risks of legitimacy challenges. 
D. Contested Role of Experts 
Climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene are un-
precedented phenomena whose complexity and implications are 
only beginning to be understood by scientists and other experts. Cli-
mate change is a multidimensional problem that concerns and con-
nects ecology, demography, development, production, consump-
tion, resource use, trade rules, health, security, urban planning, mo-
bility, migration, and more, in novel ways.249 It poses threats that are 
multi-scalar, probabilistic, indirect, often invisible, spatiotemporally 
unbound, and potentially catastrophic. These threats challenge our 
reason, emotions, and imagination.250 If there were ever a complex 
problem that required expert knowledge, it is climate change. 
Liberal democracies make significant use of expert knowledge 
in policymaking in various ways to protect liberal values, and to 
boost their efficiency, equity, and political stability.251 Expert 
knowledge is distinguished from non-expert opinion through such 
criteria as experience, professional and educational qualifications, 
peer-review, and rules of evidence.252 
Still, in a democracy, differences in expertise do not translate to 
differences in political authority, for much the same reason why dif-
ferences in lineage do not translate in this way. A democratic citizen 
can recognize expertise and accept the science of, say, climate 
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change, and still object to the expert who counsels some course of 
action: “You may be right, but who made you boss?”253 In a democ-
racy, expertise is always subservient to the voice of the people (pace 
Plato, philosophers cannot be kings).254 
For this reason, the relationships between experts and ordinary 
citizens are always potentially fraught in a democracy. These rela-
tionships vary from country to country, time to time, and issue to 
issue. Often, the relationships are placid in good times and rocky in 
hard times. Major policy failures, such as the global financial crisis 
of 2008 and the spreading of terrorist radicalization in many Euro-
pean Union countries, can lead citizens to question experts’ 
knowledge and see them as just another interest group seeking rents 
at people’s expense.255 
In the case of climate change, an additional element makes the 
role of experts potentially unpopular. Climate science, in our present 
social context, inevitably provokes fundamental questions about 
how we ought to live and organize our societies, throwing doubt on 
the ways in which we do so now. A particularly powerful and wide-
spread attempt to avoid cognitive dissonance through various forms 
of rationalization may thus come into play. After all, if something 
potentially catastrophic such as climate change can result from the 
very ways in which we live our everyday lives—how we dwell, how 
we eat, how we make things, how we move around—the nagging 
thought is that there might be something fundamentally wrong about 
the ways in which we live. These are not comfortable thoughts and 
can lead to resentment or worse towards those who bear the mes-
sage. 
The incipient conflict and simmering resentment has been ex-
ploited by powerful interests who look to be the immediate losers 
from a transition to a more sustainable way of life. They stoke the 
dissonance and encourage denialism. The most obvious manifesta-
tion of this is the climate change denial campaign, directed towards 
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preventing the formation of a consensus for political action on cli-
mate change.256 
The main strategy of climate change denialists has been to sup-
press both belief in the science and belief that there is a scientific 
consensus on the existence, anthropogenic nature, and dangerous-
ness of climate change.257 In its aims and strategies, climate change 
denialism has replicated earlier forms of denialism involving to-
bacco smoking, acid rain, DDT, and ozone depletion.258 
The rhetorical techniques adopted by climate change denialism 
have also not been particularly original: versions of these techniques 
were used in all the other cases mentioned above. These techniques 
include attacking sources rather than discussing evidence, “moving 
the goalpost” by requesting ever larger amounts of evidence, sub-
mitting false evidence, suggesting false equivalences or analogies, 
confusing ignorance about mechanisms or processes with ignorance 
about facts or outcomes, cherry-picking anomalies, selective skepti-
cism, quote mining, and the so-called “Gish gallop”—overwhelm-
ing discussants or audiences with unscientific claims to make it dif-
ficult to counter all the misinformation at once.259 
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What is new about denialism in the Anthropocene is not its strat-
egies or tactics, but its amplification. Expertise denialism now trav-
els through social media, which allows for unfiltered instant com-
munication among citizens and between citizens and representa-
tives. Traditional intermediaries—political parties, intellectuals, and 
the professional press—are increasingly made redundant by these 
technologies. Indeed, to maintain their relevance (and market share), 
these traditional intermediaries often seek to replicate the immedi-
acy and excitement of social media, compromising their own claims 
to epistemological or institutional privilege. 
One effect of the speed and directness with which political com-
munication occurs through social media is an increased tendency to 
brand political ideas and policy proposals and to market them as 
products.260 The need to engage audiences with arguments and rel-
evant facts—and even to maintain consistency in one’s opinions—
decreases, while the need for a good, resonant, quick-win pitch in-
creases. With that, the importance of expert knowledge is down-
played to the advantage of skilled branding and marketing. 
Another effect of the speed and directness with which political 
communication occurs through social media is a polarizing frag-
mentation, not just at the level of policy judgments, but also regard-
ing the sets of facts to which different individuals and groups make 
reference. Social media allows for networked, yet highly frag-
mented, political communication, making it harder to individuate 
and even debate a common story.261 
Much empirical work in psychology, economics, political sci-
ence, sociology, and communications has gone into trying to explain 
how and why disagreement about facts can occur.262 The explana-
tion seems to be some sort of “biased assimilation,” whereby people 
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adjust their view of facts with reference to their self-defining values, 
social identities, and partisan allegiances.263 Experiments on recep-
tion suggest that individuals selectively credit or dismiss infor-
mation in a manner that reinforces beliefs congenial to their val-
ues.264 These experiments found that subjects were substantially 
more likely to count a scientist as an authoritative “expert” when the 
scientist was depicted as taking a position consistent with the sub-
jects’ cultural predispositions, than when that scientist took a con-
trary position.265 Interestingly, these tendencies seem to be directly, 
rather than inversely, related to levels of science literacy and general 
education of experimental subjects: the more equipped people are to 
know and understand the facts, the more they disagree on them.266 
In times of social media, these tendencies may be amplified, in-
sofar as individuals tend to gravitate towards and engage mostly 
with resonant networks of “like-me’s” that by and large reaffirm 
their own values and perspectives.267 This may tribalize positions 
and impede constructive democratic engagement and debate from 
ever taking off on many contested issues. In addition, one can expect 
increasing polarization to also be fomented by individuals and 
groups trying to secure loyalty to their branded political ideas and 
policy proposals in this way. 
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The internet and other media, with their seemingly endless re-
sources, create the impression that expertise can be picked and cho-
sen at will, thereby feeding the perception of public life as a specta-
cle.268 Public discussions, unfiltered by “moderators,” unfold in a 
denuded space stripped of epistemological norms.269 In the United 
States at least, this has morphed into a generalized atmosphere of 
expertise denialism writ large. Denialism about evolution, vaccines, 
economics, and more has become commonplace.270 
It is not an exaggeration to say that we are on the verge of adopt-
ing epistemological nihilism as a public epistemology.271 No com-
mitment to facts, in the traditional sense, or even consistency of 
opinion, is required.272 Truth is what the speaker says it is, here and 
now. In a moment it may be different, depending on what the 
speaker can get away with. In a democracy, it is up to elections or 
approval ratings to resolve disagreements. It is a short step from here 
to other exercises of power. 
The nihilistic turn in public epistemology threatens the legiti-
macy of democracy, for democracy cannot solve the problems it 
faces without mobilizing epistemological authority that is itself hos-
tage to popular vote. As difficult as this challenge may be in favor-
able times, it is greatly magnified in the face of climate change and 
other problems of the Anthropocene. 
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E. Self-referring Decision-making 
What we have elsewhere called the “agency presupposition” is 
deeply entrenched in modern democratic theory. This presupposi-
tion holds “that the political community is constituted by agents who 
initiate and conduct political action, and who themselves, and their 
interests and welfare, are what matter politically.”273 The agency 
presupposition arose at a time in which democratic principles, norms 
and institutions were being developed to govern relations between 
agents who lived in close proximity to one another in space and time, 
and whose decisions and actions had relatively direct impacts on 
each other. However, around 1950, a profound change occurred 
from a world of discrete but interdependent states to a world of 
shared social space in which distant events have localized impacts 
and vice-versa. In this globalized world, the fates of nation-states 
and their peoples became not just effectively interdependent, but 
also structurally interconnected, with social, political, and economic 
activities, interactions, and infrastructures stretching beyond politi-
cal frontiers, leading to a deepening enmeshment of the local and 
the global.274 Political decisions and actions taken locally (in se-
lected powerful countries, many of which were democratic) now 
systematically had planetary implications, impacting for better or 
worse the welfare and interests of people in all corners of the world. 
With the Anthropocene disruption of earth’s fundamental eco-
logical systems, including those that govern climate, political agents 
(living humans who can initiate and conduct political action) have 
gained unprecedented power over a vast universe of non-agents that 
comprises animate and inanimate nature as well as those living on 
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the periphery of both space and time.275 The circle of affected non-
agents has expanded beyond cultural, genetic, and spatiotemporal 
boundaries to include virtually everything on the planet, now ex-
tended indefinitely in time.276 This establishes an enormous asym-
metry of power. Those on the periphery, and nature, cannot initiate 
and conduct political action: they cannot reciprocate, they cannot 
participate, they cannot protest, they cannot retaliate.277 In demo-
cratic terms, they do not matter—or only matter derivatively, if po-
litical agents care about their fate. And it is as undemocratic as can 
be, particularly if the democracy in question is a liberal democracy, 
to force political agents to care if they do not.278 
A phenomenon like climate change creates ubiquitous tensions 
and trade-offs between agents and non-agents—those who are gov-
erned, and those who are affected.279 The latter will suffer most from 
climate change, but a democracy responsive to the claims of future 
generations (or those living beyond its borders, or nonhuman nature) 
may often have to forgo opportunities for bringing beneficial conse-
quences to those who empower it with their votes.280 Instead, dem-
ocratic leaders would have to enact policies favoring the interests of 
those who do not vote because they do not yet exist (or live in dif-
ferent countries or are not human). 
Democracies making policies that favor non-agents will expose 
themselves to intra-generational legitimacy challenges on both pub-
lic utility grounds and expressed preference grounds.281 Even if the 
expected benefits to non-agents were great, such non-agent-oriented 
policies might not win the hearts, minds, and guts of living human 
agents who may express their preference for themselves instead—
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particularly in democracies that are already being accused of not be-
ing responsive enough to their citizens.282 Many believe that ignor-
ing or heavily discounting the welfare and interests of non-agents is 
morally wrong, but if expressed preference is important, it may be a 
wrong that democracies cannot avoid committing.283 
The agency presupposition makes government responsive to 
those who are governed but not to those who are affected beyond 
borders in space, time, citizenship, or genetic make-up. A basic pre-
supposition of liberal democracy appears to be threatened by the 
very actions that would have to be taken to express concern for all 
those affected by the climate-changing and eco-altering actions of 
its citizens. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We began this Article by explaining the notion of the Anthropo-
cene and briefly telling the story of failed responses to climate 
change. We went on to discuss the uneasy relationship between cli-
mate change and democracy, focusing on liberal democracy in par-
ticular. We presented some basic aspects of democratic theory and 
practice, and discussed some of democracy’s main vulnerabilities. 
We showed how in the Anthropocene these vulnerabilities can mag-
nify, leading to legitimacy challenges. 
These legitimacy challenges are not new. Democracy has always 
been haunted by anxiety about its future. Some political theorists 
have argued that democracy is the only form of political organiza-
tion that underwrites the seeds of its own destruction.284 Dema-
gogues and extremists who wish to blow up the state are allowed the 
same freedoms as those who seek to manage it more fairly and ef-
fectively. The risk of a democratically enabled democide is not an 
abstract or counterfactual risk: the executioners of German democ-
racy came to power through the rules and procedures of the Weimar 
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Republic.285 If we open our eyes, we may see these stories going on 
around us today. 
Modern democracy is, in many respects, the most sophisticated 
articulation of the human capacity for social organization. It is also 
the most hospitable environment for the expression of human values 
that, through centuries of emancipatory struggles, have come to be 
regarded as fundamental, such as individual liberty and political 
equality.286 Our objective in this Article is not to write a requiem for 
democracy, but rather to chart the seas that democratic theory and 
practice will have to navigate in order to successfully address cli-
mate change and survive the challenges of the Anthropocene. We 
have highlighted the vulnerabilities of democracy in order to throw 
in sharp relief the many challenges entailed by the voyage, not to 
discourage it. Democracy has shown itself to be remarkably resilient 
in the past, and it may well succeed in rising to these challenges as 
well. There are those who think that democracy doesn’t stand a 
chance.287 But many still believe that the only solution to the prob-
lems of the Anthropocene lies in more, better, or different democ-
racy.288 And there are those who think that even if democracy fails 
these challenges, democracy itself will not have failed. For they see 
its value as intrinsic, and not just as a means to better or more effec-
tive governance.289 
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It is difficult to sketch the nature of possible democratic solu-
tions to some of the issues that we have raised, and we will not try 
to do so here. Instead, we will close with a summary of what seems 
to be the main challenge ahead. The existing democratic deficits in 
liberal countries will generally have to be reduced. Yet, in the case 
of climate change and other problems of the Anthropocene, liberal 
democratic countries will have to muster both the internal coherence 
and strength to better resist populism, and the external coherence 
and strength to be more cooperative partners within the framework 
of supranational institutions. This is necessary because, in the An-
thropocene, the global spills into the domestic and vice-versa: a 
globally changing climate may have pernicious local impacts on the 
territory and population of any given country, while political dys-
function in one country can cripple efforts at global governance. 
The democracies of the Anthropocene will have to work at mul-
tiple scales in both space and time, incorporating the interests of the 
global with those of the local, and those of the future with those of 
the present. This seems to suggest, perhaps paradoxically, that the 
democracies of the Anthropocene will have to be more democratic 
in some respects and less democratic in others. The relation between 
popular sovereignty and institutions that limit popular sovereignty 
while respecting it is a tug-of-war in democratic theory and practice 
that has been going on for millennia, and is now being put to un-
precedented tests. 
Liberal democracies, in particular, have an enormous amount at 
stake. Liberal political theory has always recognized the right to re-
sist and even overthrow illegitimate political power.290 This right 
has been used to justify historical events that liberals typically ap-
plaud, including the Glorious Revolution, the French Revolution, 
and the American Revolution.291 Despite their failures and excesses, 
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these revolutions forwarded liberal values and helped to entrench 
them in institutions. Unable to find consistent responses to chal-
lenges to their own legitimacy in the Anthropocene, liberal democ-
racies may be in danger of warranting revolutions against them-
selves and the very institutions that should realize their values. They 
may become the ancient regime. 
